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was Vesalius's On the Fabric of the Human Body, published in 1543, which provided detailed illustrations of the structure of bones, muscles, organs, and blood vessels. His careful dissections produced discoveries about the structure of human bones that contradicted the accepted account of Galen, who had only dissected non-humans. The first major discovery in physiology was William Harvey's recognition in his 1628 book that blood circulates through the body as the result of the pumping action of the heart.
Although cells were first observed in the seventeenth century, it took 200 years before the discovery and acceptance of the hypotheses that all living things are made of cells and that all cells arise from preexisting cells.
During the twentieth century, many hypotheses about the functioning of the human body were generated and confirmed, establishing the fields of genetics and molecular biology that provided the basis for modern molecular understanding of the causes of health and disease. Table 1 summarizes some of the most important medical discoveries concerned with basic biological processes. All of these discoveries eventually contributed to discovery of the causes and treatments of disease, with a delay of decades or even centuries. For example, van Leeuwenhoek's discovery of "little animals" such as bacteria only became medically important 200 years later with the development of the germ theory of disease.
All of these basic medical discoveries involved hypotheses about biological structure or function, and some required the introduction of new concepts such as cell, gene, and Table 1 . Some major discoveries concerning medically important biological processes.
Discoveries that are more specifically medical concern the causes of diseases.
Until modern Western medicine emerged in the nineteenth century, the predominant world theories attributed disease to bodily imbalances, involving the humors of Hippocratic medicine, the yin, yang and chi of traditional Chinese medicine, and the doshas of traditional Indian Ayurvedic medicine. Pasteur revolutionized the explanation of disease in the 1860s with the hypothesis that many diseases such as cholera are caused by bacteria. In the twentieth century, other diseases were connected with infectious agents, including viruses and prions. The nutritional causes of some diseases were identified in the early twentieth century, for example how vitamin C deficiency produces scurvy. Autoimmune diseases require explanation in terms of malfunction of the body's immune system, as when multiple sclerosis arises from damage to myelin in the central nervous system. Some diseases such as cystic fibrosis have a simple genetic basis arising from inherited mutated genes, while in other diseases such as cancer the molecular/genetic causes are more complex. The general form of a hypothesis about disease causation is: disease D is caused by factor F, where F can be an external agent such as a microbe or an internal malfunction. Table 2 . Some major discoveries concerning the causes of diseases.
The third kind of medical hypothesis, and potentially the most useful, concerns the treatment and prevention of disease. Hypotheses about treatment of disease based on traditional imbalance theories, for example the use in Hippocratic medicine of bloodletting to balance humors, have been popular but unsubstantiated. In contrast, Edward Jenner's discovery in the 1790s that inoculation provides immunity to smallpox has saved millions of lives, as has the twentieth-century discoveries of drugs to counter the infectious properties of bacteria and viruses. The discovery of insulin in the 1920s
provided an effective means of treating type 1 diabetes, which had previouisly been fatal.
Treatments need not actually cure a disease to be useful: consider the contribution of steroids to diminishing the symptoms of autoimmune diseases, and the use of painkillers such as aspirin to treat various afflictions. Surgical treatments have often proved useful for treating heart disease and cancer.
It might seem that the most rational way for medicine to progress would be from basic biological understanding to knowledge of the causes of a disease to treatments for the disease. Often, however, effective treatments have been found long before deep understanding of the biological processes they affect. For example, aspirin was used as a painkiller for most of a century before its effect on prostaglandins was discovered, and antibiotics such as penicillin were in use for decades before it became known how they kill bacteria. Lithium provided a helpful treatment for bipolar (manic-depressive) disorder long before its mechanism of action on the brain was understood. On the other hand, some of the discoveries about causes listed in table 2 led quickly to therapeutic treatments, as when the theory that ulcers are caused by bacterial infection was immediately tested by treating ulcer patients with antibiotics (Thagard, 1999) . was not, as it turned out millennia later, a very good account of the causes and treatments of disease, but at least it suggested how medicine could be viewed as akin to science rather than religion. In modern medicine, one of the great methodological advances was Koch's postulates for identifying the causes of infectious diseases (Brock 1988, p. 180 ):
1) The parasitic organism must be shown to be constantly present in characteristic form and arrangement in the diseased tissue.
2) The organism which, from its behavior appears to be responsible for the disease, must be isolated and grown in pure culture.
3) The pure culture must be shown to induce the disease experimentally.
It turned out that these requirements, identified by Koch in the 1870s as part of his investigation of tuberculosis, are sometimes too stringent a requirement for inferring causes of infectious diseases, because some infectious agents are extremely difficult to culture and/or transmit. But the postulates have been useful for setting a high standard for identifying infectious agents. A third methodological breakthrough was the use, beginning only in the late 1940s, of controlled clinical trials in the investigation of the efficacy of medical treatments. Only decades later was it widely recognized that medical practices should ideally be determined by the results of randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trials, with the emergence of the movement for evidence-based medicine in the 1990s. None of these three methodological breakthroughs involve the discovery of particular medical hypotheses, but they have been crucial to development of well-founded medical views about the causes and treatments of diseases. (Popper, 1959, p. 21 ). The book is concerned with logic, not discovery. Like Reichenbach (1938) and many other philosophers of science influenced by formal logic, Popper thought philosophy should not concern itself with psychological processes of discovery.
LOGICAL PATTERNS
The term "logic" had come to mean "formal logic" in the tradition of Frege and Russell, in contrast to the broader earlier conception of logic as the science and art of reasoning. In John Stuart Mill's (1970 Mill's ( /1843 ) System of Logic, for example, logic is in part concerned with the mental processes of reasoning, which include inferences involved in scientific discovery.
If logic means just "formal deductive logic", then there is no logic of discovery.
But N. R. Hanson (1958 Hanson ( , 1965 argued for a broader conception of logic, which could be concerned not only with reasons for accepting an hypothesis but also with reasons for entertaining a hypothesis in the first place. He borrowed from Charles Peirce the idea of a kind of reasoning called abduction or retroduction, which involves the introduction of hypotheses to explain puzzling facts. By abduction Peirce meant "the first starting of a hypothesis and the entertaining of it, whether as a simple interrogation or with any degree of confidence" (Peirce 1931 (Peirce -1958 . Unfortunately, Peirce was never able to say what the first starting of a hypothesis amounted to, aside from speculating that people have an instinct for guessing right. In multiple publications, Hanson only managed to say that a logic of discovery would include a study of the inferential moves from the recognition of an anomaly to the determination of which types of hypothesis might serve to explain the anomaly (Hanson, 1965, p. 65) . Researchers in artificial intelligence have attempted to use formal logic to model abductive reasoning, but Thagard and Shelley (1997) describe numerous representational and computational shortcomings of these approaches, such as that explanation is often not a deductive relation.
The closest we could get to a logical pattern of hypothesis generation for medical discovery, in the case of disease, would be something like:
Anomaly: People have disease D with symptoms S.
Hypothesis: Cause C can produce S.
Inference: So maybe C is the explanation of D.
For Pasteur, this would be something like:
Anomaly: People have cholera with symptoms of diarrhea, etc.
Hypothesis: Infection by a bacterium might cause such symptoms.
Inference: So maybe bacterial infection is the explanation of cholera. Quine (1968) and Goldman (1986) rejects the expulsion of psychology from philosophical method. I will now try to show how richer patterns in medical discovery can be identified from the perspective of modern cognitive psychology.
PSYCHOLOGICAL PATTERNS
We saw in the last section that little can be said about discovery from the perspective of a philosophy of science that emphasizes logical structure and inference patterns. In contrast, a more naturalistic perspective that takes into account the psychological processes of practicing scientists has the theoretical resources to explain in much detail how discoveries come about. These resources derive from the development since the 1960s of the field of cognitive psychology, which studies the representations and procedures that enable people to accomplish a wide range of inferential tasks, from problem solving to language understanding. Starting in the 1980s, some philosophers of science have drawn on cognitive science to enrich accounts of the structure and growth of science knowledge (see e.g. Carruthers, Stich, and Seigal, 2002; Darden, 1991 Darden, , 2006 Giere, 1988; Nersessian, 1992; Thagard, 1988 Thagard, , 1992 Thagard, , 1999 . On this view, we should think of a scientific theory as a kind of mental representation that scientists can employ for many purposes such as explanation and discovery. Then scientific discovery is the generation of mental representations such as concepts and hypotheses.
I will not attempt a comprehensive account of all the cognitive processes relevant to discovery, nor attempt to apply them to explain the large number of discoveries listed in tables 1-4. Instead I will review a cognitive account of a single major medical Discovery results from two psychological processes, questioning and search, and from serendipity. Warren's initial discovery of spiral gastric bacteria was entirely serendipitous, happening accidentally in the course of his everyday work as a pathologist.
Warren reacted to his observation of these bacteria with surprise, as it was generally believed that bacteria could not long survive the acidic environment of the stomach.
This surprise, along with general curiosity, led him to generate questions concerning the nature and possible medical significance of the bacteria. Here we see the origin of a new concept, that is a mental representation of the bacteria that Warren observed through a microscope. Marshall's questioning about the medical significance of these bacteria was driven, not only by curiosity, but also by medical needs, as he was aware that available medical treatments for stomach ulcers using antacids were not very effective, diminishing symptoms but not preventing recurrences.
Warren had observed that the bacteria were associated with inflammation of the stomach (gastritis), and Marshall knew that gastritis is associated with peptic ulcer, so they naturally formed the hypothesis that the bacteria might be associated with ulcers. A 1982 study using endoscopy and biopsies found that patients with ulcers were far more likely to have H. pylori infections than patients without ulcers. They accordingly generated the hypothesis that the bacteria cause ulcers, by analogy with the many infectious diseases that had been identified since Pasteur. The natural psychological heuristic used here is something like: if A and B are associated, then A may cause B or vice versa. In order to show that A actually does cause B, it is desirable to manipulate A in a way that produces a change in B. Marshall and Warren were initially stymied, however, because of difficulties in carrying out the obvious experiments of giving animals H. pylori to induce ulcers and of giving people with ulcers antibiotics to try to kill the bacteria and cure the ulcers. Within a few years, however, they had discovered a regime involving multiple antibiotics that was effective at eradicating the bacteria, and by the early 1990s there were multiple international studies that showed that such eradication often cured ulcers.
The discoveries of Marshall and Warren involve two main kinds of conceptual change. The first kind was introduction of the new concept of Helicobacter pylori, which was the result of both perceptual processes of observing the bacteria and of cognitive processes of conceptual combination. Originally they thought that the bacteria might belong to a known species, Campylobacter, hence the original name
Campylobacter pylori, signifying that the new species inhabited the pylorus, the part of the stomach that connects to the duodenum. However, morphological and RNA analysis revealed that the new bacteria were very different from Campylobacter, so that they were reclassified as members of a new genus. Such reclassification is a second major kind of conceptual change, in that the discovery that bacteria cause ulcers produced a dramatic reclassification of the peptic ulcer disease. Previously, ulcers were viewed as metabolic diseases involving acid imbalance, or even, in older views as being psychosomatic diseases resulting from stress. Through the work of Marshall and Warren, peptic ulcers (except for some caused by non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs such as aspirin) were reclassified as infectious diseases, just like tuberculosis and cholera.
Thus the discovery of the bacterial theory of ulcers involved the generation and revision of mental representations. New concepts such as H. pylori were formed, and conceptual systems for bacteria and diseases were reorganized. Also generated were hypotheses, such as that bacteria cause ulcers and that ulcers can be treated with antibiotics. Both these sorts of representations can be produced by psychological processes of questioning, search, conceptual combination, and causal reasoning.
Analogy is a psychological process that often contributes to scientific discovery (Holyoak and Thagard, 1995) . Marshall and Warren reasoned analogically when they thought that ulcers might be like more familiar infectious diseases. Other analogies have contributed to medical discoveries, such as Semmelweiss' mental leap from how a colleague became sick as the result of a cut during an autopsy to the hypothesis that childbed fever was being spread by medical students. Thagard (1999, ch. 9 ) describes other analogies that have contributed to medical discoveries, such as Pasteur's realization that disease is like fermentation in being caused by germs, and Funk's argument that scurvy is like beriberi in being caused by a vitamin deficiency. Thus analogy, like questioning, search, concept formation, and causal reasoning is an identifiable psychological pattern of discovery applicable to medical innovations.
NEURAL PATTERNS
The field of cognitive psychology is currently undergoing a major transformation in which the study of brain processes is becoming more and more central. (Thagard, 1988) . But the neural process for Warren's new concept is considerably more complicated, as it requires integrating multiple representations including both verbal and nonverbal aspects. Here is a sketch of how this neural process might operate.
A crucial theoretical construct in cognitive psychology and neuroscience is working memory (Smith and Kosslyn, 2007; Fuster, 2004) . This new account of multimodal conceptual combination goes well beyond the symbolic theory that I have applied to scientific discovery (Thagard, 1988) . As Barsalou, et al. (2003) argue, conceptual representations are often grounded in specific sensory modalities. For example, the concept brown is obviously connected with visual representation, as are more apparently verbal concepts like automobile, which may involve auditory and olfactory representations as well as visual ones. One advantage of theorizing at the neural level is that all of these kinds of verbal and sensory representations have the same underlying form: patterns of activity in neural groups.
Hence newly generated concepts such as brown automobile and, more creatively, gastric spiral bacteria, can consist of neural activities that integrate verbal and sensory representations.
TECHNOLOGICAL PATTERNS
My discussion of logical, psychological, and neural patterns of medical discovery has so far concerned the contributions of human beings to medical advances. But medical research is increasingly relying on computers, not only to store information about biological systems but also to help generate new hypotheses about the causes and cures of disease. This section briefly sketches some emerging patterns of discovery that involve interactions between people and computers. GenBank, the genetic sequence database compiled by the U. S. National Institutes of Health, contains over 50 million sequence records. These records include descriptions of many viruses, which proved useful in identifying the cause of the disease SARS that suddenly emerged in 2003. Within a few months, scientists were able to use the GenBank information and other technologies such as microarrays to determine that the virus responsible for SARS is a previously unidentified coronoavirus (Wang, et al., 2003) . Without computational methods for identifying the DNA structure of the virus associated with SARS and for comparing it with known structures, knowledge of the cause of SARS would have been greatly limited. Thus computers are beginning to contribute to understanding of the causes of human diseases.
New technologies are also being developed to help find treatments for disease.
Robots are increasingly used in automated drug discovery as part of the attempt to find effective new treatments, for example new antibiotics that are not resistant to existing treatments. Lamb et al. (2006) describe their production of a "connectivity map", a computer-based reference collection of gene-expression profiles from cultured human cells treated with bioactive small molecules, along with pattern-matching software. This collection has the potential to reveal new connections among genes, diseases, and drug treatments. Thus recent decades have seen the emergence of a new class of patterns of medical discovery in which human researchers cooperate with computers. Scientific cognition is increasingly distributed, not only among different researchers, but also among researchers and computers with which they interact (Thagard, 1993 (Thagard, , 2006 Giere, 2002) . Because medical discovery is increasingly a matter of distributed cognition, the philosophy of medicine needs to investigate the epistemological implications of the collaborative, techological nature of medical research.
CONCLUSION
Although not much can be said about the formal logic of medical discovery, I
hope to have shown that discovery is a live topic in the philosophy of medicine. We have seen that there are four kinds of discovery that require investigation, concerning basic biological processes, the causes of disease, the treatment of disease, and the development of new instruments for diagnosing and treating diseases. Psychological patterns of discovery include the development of new hypotheses by questioning, search, and causal reasoning, and the development of new concepts by combining old ones.
Research in the burgeoning field of cognitive neuroscience is making it possible to raise, and begin to answer, questions about the neural processes that enable scientists to form hypotheses and generate concepts. In addition, philosophers can investigate how computers are increasingly contributing to new medical discoveries involving basic biological processes and the causes of disease. A major aim of the philosophy of medicine is to explain the growth of medical knowledge. Developing a rich, interdisciplinary account of the patterns of medical discovery should be a central part of that explanation.
